summarizes and supplements Center books and working papers and features other selected work on public policy questions. Arti~ des in QQ are intended to advance philosophically informed debate on current policy choices ; the views presented are not necessarily those of the Center or its sponsors.
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In this issue:
The U.S. government admits Cuban refugees while excluding Haitians, arguing that the Cubans flee political persecution while the Haitians merely flee poverty. Does this distinction make a difference to our national obligations to accept our share of the world's refugees? . Two Caribbean islands with allegedly repressive regimes; two mass emigrations to the allegedly friendlier shores of the United States. Yet the vast majority of those fleeing Castro's Cuba have been peacefully and successfull y settled in their new land, while those fleeing Duvalier's Haiti are intercepted at sea or in carcerated by the thousands in massive detainment camps. Of the 125,000 Cubans who emigrated during the "Freedom Flotilla" o( 1980, an estimated 98 percent have been admitted to legal resident status in a relatively quiet and orderly fashion. Yet the Immigration and Natural· ization Service has laun ched a campaign to turn back Haitian vesse]s enroute to Florida and forcibly send away Haitians whose tiny boats survive the 600 miles of open sea. A grudging welcome is extended to the one group but denied to the other. The official reason: the Cubans, but not the Haitians, are recognized as refugees.
Who counts as a refugee? The most widely ratified official definition is given by the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees : a refugee is one who "owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" is unable or unwilling (because of such well-founded fear) to return to his country of nationality, or, if he has no nationality, to his country of habitual residence.
On the Convention definition, flight from persecution is the only recognized basis of refugee status. This definition has been incorporated into American law wi th the passage of the Refugee Act of 1980, which also defines refugees as victims of political persecution. The definition was somewhat broadened by the Organization of African Unity's 1969 Convention on Refugees, , I
. j .
i I
Report from the Center for ratified by eighteen nations, which extends refugee status to those fleeing "external aggression, foreign domination, or events seriously disturbing public order." Certainly, many of what have been widely treated as the most pressing refugee problems of the past decade have involved massive dislocations of people who are not simply victims of persecution. But even this broader definition excludes explicitly economic factors as a basis of refugee status. The African definition, and much current practice, looks beyond persecution to the horrors of war and its aftermath, but does not look further to include flight from famine, malnutrition, disease, and extreme poverty. Refugee status is not accorded those who flee intolerable economic conditions. The distinction between political and economic motives serves to draw the line between refugees and other immigrants who cannot plead the refugee's claim of special urgency.
The U.S. government maintains that the Haitians 
Coercion and Choice
One rationale given for the distinction between (political) refugees and other (economic) migrants is that the former lea ve involuntarily ; the latter leave freely. Refugees are forced or coerced to abandon their homelands, while immigrants leave of their own free choice, in pursui t of economic bettermen t. Refugees are sa id to be "pushed"; mi grants, "pulled ."
Why should po litica l persecutio n seem more coercive than economic desperation? One answer might be that persecutio n involves the deliberate use of fo rce by hum 
See the review of Amartya Sen's Poverty and Famines:
An Essay on Entitlemen t and Deprivation, p. 14 The distincti o n betw een vo luntary and invo lun ta ry is neither sharp nor clear. In any case, as Lichtenberg poin ts o ut, "The grounds fo r it do not coincide wi th the dis tinction between political-and economic motives. One may be pushed just as ha rd by economic fo rces as by political ones. The prospect of starvat ion, whateve r its cause, is as irresistible a force for change as the prospect of physical aggression. "
Po litical persecution and economic ha rd ship bo th admit of degrees. Persecution may range from imprisonment and even execution to relatively minor restrictio ns o n relatively inessential activities . Economic hard ship may range fro m starv ation for oneself and o ne's fa mil y to dissatisfactio n w ith a cramped ran ge of o ptions fo r financia l advancement. Lichtenberg concludes, "The relevant contrast is no t betw een refugees, w ho flee persecution, and mig rants, who seek economic advancement, but between those who are forcibly dislocated, w hether for po lit ical or econo mic reasons, and th ose whose departure is more v olun tary. "
Negative and Positive Rights
A second motiv ation fo r distinguishing between po litica l and economic motiv es for immigration lies in a supposed difference in the underl ying rights to which appeal is made. It is w idely believed that rights to political freedom take priority over rights to economic well-being. Certainly in the United States political rights Re po rt fro m the Center o r ~& ( are giv en the fi rmest Constituti onal guarantees under the Bill of Rig hts, whi le economic ri ghts a re left to the good graces of Congress to bestow or withhold . Perhaps in the same way the political ri ghts of refugees fl eeing persecution take priority over the rights of those w ho seek economic ends . Ju st as econo mic ri ghts are often held to be spurious, so economic immigrants are denied refugee status and its pro tections.
The priority of po liti ca l over economic rights is often taken as a specifi c instance of the priority of negative rights over positi ve rights genera lly . Positive rights require o ther people to act positively-to do something-w hile nega ti ve rights require o ther people merely to re frain from ac tin g in certain ways. Since positi ve rights require o ther people to do more than negative rights do-perh aps more than people can donegative ri ghts, it is argued, should be full y guaranteed fi rst. The fulfillment of positive rights is secondary.
Rights to freedo m fro m po li tical persecution are often considered to be nega ti ve rights-ri ghts tha t o thers refrain fro m in te rfe ring wi th o ne's speech, worship, peaceful assembly , movement, unless due cause is show n for that interference. Economic rights are usually held to be positive ri ghts-rights that the government and its institutions provid e fo r social security, income support, food stamps, subsidized medical care . To respect political rights, on this view, all the government need do is to leave its citi zens alo ne, no t to harm or harrass them, not to stifl e their o pen expression of dissent, no t to ban their newspapers o r close their churches . Respect for economic rig hts places far greater demands on the resources o f the state and its citizenry. Thus economic rights, as positive rights, are less important.
Hen ry Shue, Acting Director of the Center for Philosophy and Public Policy, challenges the claim that political and economic rights can be identified as respectively nega tive and positive. In Basic Rights: Subsistence, A fflu ence, and U.S. Fo reign Policy, he points out that the duties corresponding to both political and Po litical persecutio n and economic hardship both admit of degrees: "The relevan t contrast is not behveen refugees, w ho flee persecution, and migrants, who seek economic advancement, but between th ose who are forcib ly dislocated, whether for political or economic reasons, and those whose departure is more voluntary. " economic ri ghts involve takin g positive steps to ensure their protection as we ll as merely refraining from their violation. "What people want a nd need," Shue explains, "is the protection of their rights. " Unprotected ri ghts are unfortunately w orth very little in an insecure world: "In any imperfect society enj oyment of a ri ght will depend to some extent upon protection against those who do not choose not to violate it. "
:;' I I Report from the Center for Thus political rights require far more than mere governmental restraint. They involve as weB setting in place a complicated and expensive apparatus for upholding and protecting those rights: for example, establishing and financing a judicial system capable of prosecuting and punishing violations. Likewise, while economic rights may entail positive duties on the part of others to provide the essentials for subsistence, often "all that is necessary is to protect the persons whose subsistence is threatened from the individuals and institutions that will otherwise intentionally or unintentionally harm them .... The request is not to be supported, but to be allowed to be self-supporting on the basis of one's own hard work." Poli tical and economic rights do not, th en, give rise to greater and lesser obligations.
Shue's pOint is especially telling once political and economic refugees have crossed our borders. Both categories of refugees make the same kinds of claims on our government and its resources: to be allowed to live in political freedom and to work for a minimally decent wage. Bo th require the same institutional apparatus to admit and resettle them in a nondisruptive manner and to provide them the opportunity to become productive and self-supporting. The original difference in their motives for immigration, if ever it was relevant, is relevantnolonger.
Is there any other ground for granting the popular priority of political over economic rights, some ground that does not appeal to the ease or difficulty of their fulfillment? It seems not. According to Shue, economic rights are basic rights. By this he means not that they are especially valuable or intrinsically satisfying, but that they are essential to the enjoyment of any other right. "When a right is genuinely basic, any attempt to enjoy any o ther right by sacrificing the basic right would be quite li terally self-defeating. " Economic rights to a ....... 4 minimal level of subsistence are basic in this sense: "No one can fully, if at all, enjoy any right that is supposedly protected by society if he or she lacks the essentials for a reasonably healthy and active life. " Indeed, for Shue, at least some political rights seem less basic, on this criterion, than rights to subsistence.
We cannot be justified, then, in welcoming Cuban refugees and deporting Haitian refugees if we do so by appealing to an essential moral difference in the nature of the rights that are at stake in the two cases. The poll tical-economic distinction may nonetheless yield a practical, if not theoretical, explanation for a difference in obligations. First, while the world's political refugees number an estimated 16 million, more than 350 million people worldwide are unemployed or severely underemployed. Thus the class of economic migrants is potentially enormous. Some limits must be set on moral responsibility, and to assign priority to whatever happens to be the smaller class of obligations may be one way to set these limits.
Rights to political freedom have no priority over
It is not, however, a very good way. It indeed seems National Autonomy and Its Limits: "There is, however, one group of needy outsiders whose claims cannot be met by ... exporting wealth, but only by taking people in . This is the group of refugees, whose need is for membership itself, a nonexportable good. The liberty that makes certain countries possible homes for men and women whose politics or religion isn't tolerated where they live is also nonexportable; at least we have found no way of exporting it. These goods can be shared only within the protected space of a particular state. " The goods that relieve economic distress are at least in theory exportable. Thus it can be argued that the world's needy can be helped directly by some form of developmental assistance. Money can be moved to people, instead of people to money. This reply has no force, however, if we do not in fact avail ourselves of these other alternatives for reducing the sum total of the world's misery. The existence of other options relieves us of responsibility to accept economic refugees only if we indeed take advantage of them.
Direct aid to the world's poor has upper limits placed on
its feasibility. Often poverty results not from natural scarcity as much as from deliberately maintained patterns of economic inequality or abuses of political power.
Furthermore, direct aid to the world's poor has upper limits placed on its feasibility. Often poverty results not from natural scarcity as much as from deliberately maintained patterns of economic inequality or abuses of political power . In this Haiti is a case in point: Haitian poverty has been linked to the political In dealing with such nations, of course, the United States should apply what diplomatic levers it can to press for greater domestic equality . But likewise, the United States should also use its influence to alter the repressive policies of totalitarian or authoritarian states in their denial of political liberties. Often we may be reluctant to "interfere, " protective of our own national interest. Often such diplomatic strategies and pressures are to li ttle avail. In the meantime there may be millions of people, suffering both politically and economically, who cannot wait for diplomatic channels to be exhausted. For them there may be no alternative but to throw themselves upon the fundamental moral decency of the rest of the world and ask to be taken in . 
